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Abstract
We study the e¤ects ”globalization” on wage inequality. Our ”global” economy resem-
bles Rosen (1981) ”Superstars” economy, where a) innovations in production and commu-
nication technologies enable suppliers to reach a larger mass of consumers and to improve
the (perceived) quality of their products and b) trade barriers fall.
When transport costs fall, income is redistributed away from the non-exporting to the
exporting sector of the economy. As the latter turns out to employ workers of higher skill
and pay, the e¤ect is to raise wage inequality. Whether the least skilled are stand to lose
or gain from improved production or communication technologies, in contrast, depends on
wether technology is skill-complement or substitute.
The model provides an intuitive explanation for why changes in wage premia are so
strongly a¤ected by exports’ growth in plant-level empirical investigations (Bernard and
Jensen (1997)).
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”Globalization”, ”Internet economy”, ”Electronic trade” are the buzzwords of the day. How-
ever, the enthusiasm for the opportunities o¤ered by new markets and technologies is often
cooled down by worries concerning their possible consequences on income distribution. Will a
globalized society be more or less ”equal”? Who will be the winners and the losers? In spite
of abundant empirical work aimed at assessing the causes of increasing wage inequality, the
distributive implications of globalization are not yet fully understood.
”New” trade theory based on imperfect competition, while accounting for the failure of
international convergence in factor prices, are in general silent about the implications of trade
integration upon within-countries inequality.1 A general prediction is that intra-industry trade
has a small e¤ect on income distribution, and is likely to lead to higher welfare for all agents.
Traditional trade theory predicts that trade integration between developed and less de-
veloped countries will bene…t skilled workers in the former, and manual workers in the latter
(assuming these are the relatively abundant factors in the two areas). This view is generally
refuted by the data. The actual changes in product prices generated by trade integration are
hardly su¢cient to explain the observed deterioration of the relative position of the unskilled.2
In addition, the Stolper-Samuelson theorem cannot account for the fact that inequality has
risen dramatically within narrowly de…ned segments of the labor market (Juhn at al. (1993)
[11]) i.e. between workers of similar occupations, education levels, and, in general, belonging
to similar ”skill” categories.
The conventional view is that the most part of the rise in wage inequality during the last
two decades is not due to changes in relative product demand associated with trade. The
culprit is more often identi…ed in shifts in labor demand, away from the unskilled, induced by
technological change within most industries (see, e,g., Lawrence and Slaughter (1993)[12]).
1See, for instance, Helpman and Krugman (1986)[8].
2See Freeman (1995)[5], Rodrik (1997)[14] and Slaughter and Swagel (1997)[16] among recent surveys on the
empirical literature concerning the trade and wages debate.
2The empirical work aimed at assessing the e¤ect of trade on wage inequality has only
recently shifted from industry to …rm-level analysis. A number of studies, conducted at …rm
or establishment level, have found robust empirical links between exporting activity, …rms’
performance, and wages. Bernard and Wagner (1998)[3], in a study on export decision of
German …rms in Saxony, …nd evidence that ”successful plants, measured by size or productivity,
are more likely to become exporters, as plants with greater shares of skilled labor”.3 Bernard
and Jensen (1997)[1], in a plant-level study for the US, …nd that skilled/unskilled wage premia
has been rising during the eighties especially due to between-plants changes, with the most
part of these changes explained by plants’ export growth. This new ”micro” evidence seems to
suggest that changes in the goods market, and those related to trade in particular, have indeed
a role in explaining the rise of wage inequality.
This paper studies the e¤ects globalization on wage inequality in a model that accounts for
the positive association between exporting, market size, and wage premia.
Our description of a ”global economy” is based on three crucial ingredients. The …rst is
increasing returns in production. Market size matters. This is the basic tenets of ”new” trade
theory. The second is the role of technology in production and communication. Technological
improvements enable more talented suppliers to improve the quality of their products and allow
…rms to reach a larger mass of consumers. The third ingredient is transport costs and market
access costs that segment the international market. As globalization proceeds, barriers to trade
tend to fall. Combining these ingredients into a simple trade model, we obtain a representation
of the ”global” economy that is reminiscent of Rosen’s (1981)[15] ”Economics of Superstar”.4
In his seminal paper, Rosen discussed the role that non-convexities in production may
exert on income distribution. Some products are like non rival public goods: singing on a
satellite-broadcast TV program or in a small cafe requires approximately the same e¤ort.
3Bernard and Jensen (1998)[3] …nd consistent evidence: larger and faster growing …rms are more likely to
start exporting.
4See also Grossman and Maggi (1998)[6] for a representation for an open ”Superstars” economy based on the
use of submodular production functions.
3For products where these non-convexities are particular important and where ”talents” are
particularly appreciated by consumers, even small di¤erences in ”skills” are associated with
disproportionate di¤erences in incomes (think of the show-biz, sport, science etc.).
Frank and Cook (1995)[4] recent best seller has popularized the idea of ”winner-take-all”
markets. To the extent that the earnings of executives and sta¤ workers are increasingly tied to
…rm performance, the tendency towards increasing di¤erentials in earnings is likely to spread
from professionals and executives towards salaries and wages (as shown, for instance, in Hall
and Liebman (1998)[7]).
In this paper we take an admittedly extreme view of the labor market. Individuals derive
their income from the rents associated with their speci…c skills. As in Rosen, the income
distribution is shaped by the distribution of rents generated by individual abilities. To that we
add a fully-‡edged general equilibrium model, where the interaction between the distribution
of wages, the size of …rms and exporting decisions can be analyzed.
We consider a monopolistic competition trade model (Krugman (1980)[9]), where workers
di¤er in their abilities. Firms supply di¤erent product varieties, and this generates demand
”niches” and market power for all sellers. However, the usual symmetry that characterizes
monopolistic competition models does not hold in our formulation because those …rms that
employ better workers also manage to produce goods of better quality, to capture larger market
shares and to enjoy higher pro…ts. Due to the presence of a …xed cost to access foreign markets,
only …rms employing a ”high-level” sta¤ bene…t from exporting. In such a setting, the decision
to export is explicitly modelled, so that the economy’s degree of openness and the distribution
of income are jointly determined.
As barriers to trade fall, more …rms will bene…t from exporting and will have access to
a larger market. Competition for skills boost skill premia in exporting …rms. Hence, trade
integration unambiguously leads to a redistribution of income from the workers employed in
non-exporting …rms to those employed in the export sector. Since the latter employs workers of
greater skills, trade integration raises wage inequality. Even if aggregate welfare unambiguously
4rises following a reduction in trade barriers, low-skilled workers may end up losing in nominal
and even in real terms.
The introduction of new technologies allows …rms to improve the quality of their prod-
ucts, and enables them to better communicate the characteristics of these goods to consumers.
Hence, consumers everywhere start discriminating more and more among products, placing in-
creasing weight on their (perceived) quality. As in the case of reduced trade barriers, consumers
will concentrate their purchases on best-sellers products. Once general equilibrium e¤ects are
taken into account, however, it emerges that the redistributive e¤ects of technological progress
crucially depends upon the degree of complementarity of technology with workers’ skills. More-
over, contrary to trade integration, technical change may reduce the share of exporting …rms
in the economy.
These …ndings may be useful in disentangling trade and technology when interpreting em-
pirical evidence. Increasing wage inequality would be systematically associated with export
growth only when globalization takes place via reduced trade barriers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model.
Consumers’ and …rms’ problems are solved in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the general
equilibrium solution. Some comparative statics exercises are performed in Section 5. Section 6
summarizes the main conclusions.
2. The Model
The world consists of two symmetric countries. We focus on the domestic country. Firms pro-
duce di¤erentiated goods under imperfect competition and free-entry. Consumers like variety,
according with the Dixit-Stiglitz formulation. Production requires two factors of production:
skill (”talent”), whose total endowment is denoted by S, and a composite primary input, M
(unskilled labor, raw materials). The market for production factors is competitive. The econ-
omy is populated by a continuum of households-workers, indexed by h, h 2 [0;H]. Worker h
is endowed with the amount raw inputs Mh,
R H
0 Mhdh = M. Skills are measured by the index
5s. More talented workers are characterized by higher s. Skills are distributed over the interval
[s;s], according to an everywhere continuous cumulative distribution whose associated density
is denoted by Á(s). Necessarily,
R s
s Á(s)sds = S. Production requires one skilled worker and an
amount of composite input proportional to output. Raw inputs provide standardized services
for production. Workers’ skills improves the quality of the product. As a consequence, products
are di¤erentiated both along a horizontal dimension (variety) and a vertical one (quality).
Shipping entails a iceberg transport cost plus a …xed market access cost (setting up a
network of distributors abroad, covering legal expenses, etc.). Because of the …xed export
costs, some …rms prefer not to export their output at all. On the other hand, because of
iceberg transport costs, no …rm is willing to sell their production on the foreign market alone.
As a result, …rms may either sell only on the domestic market, or in both domestic and foreign
markets.
2.1. Production Technology
There is one consumption good, X, which is suitable to be di¤erentiated along a continuum of
varieties i, i 2 R: Each variety i is produced out of raw inputs, M; and skill, S. Each worker
can employ her skills in the production of at most one variety of good X. The size of …rms is
normalized in such a way that one …rm employs the skill of one worker. Each …rm thus supplies
only one variety. Raw inputs requirements are proportional to output. Let w(s) and v denote,
respectively, the return to skills of a worker endowed with ”talent” s and that of raw inputs
M. The cost of producing X units of variety i; when a type-s(i) worker is involved is:
C(s(i);i) = w(s(i)) + v¯X(s(i);i) + ±iv°: (2.1)
The parameter ¯ represents the inverse of marginal productivity of raw inputs (units of inputs
required for producing one unit of the variety i). The third term on the right hand side has
the following interpretation. If the …rm also sells in the foreign market it has to incur a …xed
costs °, which represents the extra units of composite inputs that are required to export 5. We
5Market access costs have been modelled as …xed costs in other papers. See, for instance, Smith and Venables
(1991)[17]. Empirically, …xed (sunk) costs seem to play a crucial role in a¤ecting export decisions (see, for
6denote the set of all di¤erent varieties supplied by N, and the subset of traded goods by Ne: If
the variety i belongs to Ne; then ±i = 1 and the …rms sells at home and abroad. If the variety
is not exported, i = 2 Ne; ±i = 0; and no cost is incurred.
Firms are atomistic pro…t-maximizers. They produce goods which are imperfect substitutes
and set their price, taking as given other …rms’ choices (the ”large group” Chamberlinian
hypothesis holds). Consumers’ utility increases with the extent of variety in consumption.
As it is standard in monopolistic competition models, love for variety plus increasing returns
in production insure that no …rm is willing to supply the same variant o¤ered by a rival.
However, contrary to standard monopolistic competition models, the number of products here
is determined by the equilibrium condition of the skill market. Since each …rm requires the skill
of one worker, we have necessarily that N = H. In turn, the condition of free-entry ensures
that skilled workers perceive all the operating pro…ts realized by …rms. Workers’ income is thus
constituted by the sum of earnings from their endowment of raw inputs (sold on a competitive
market) and skill rents associated with …rms’ operating pro…ts.6 This is a …rst analogy of our
model with Rosen (1981)[15].
2.2. Preferences
Households have identical tastes, but di¤erent incomes, depending on their endowments of
production factors. The income of household h, endowed with skills s and rawinputs Mh, is
thus
Ih(s;Mh) = vMh + w(s) (2.2)
Consumers like variety, in the sense that their utility is increasing with the number of vari-
eties consumed, according with the Dixit-Stigliz formulation. A distinguishing feature of our
formulation is that more talented entrepreneurs produce better quality of each variety, and
better quality is appreciated by consumers. Households derive utility from a combination of
instance, Bernard and Wagner (1988) [3] and Roberts and Tybout (1997) [13])
6In the remainder of the paper we will use indi¤erently the words wages, skill premia, or skill earnings, in
referring to the rents accruing to workers’ skills.
7the quantity, X; and the ”quality”, indexed by T(:); of each good. In this sense, a commodity
is assimilated to a bundle of a physical good, X; and of an intangible good, T(:) (the gri¤e
of a fashionable tailor, the sound of a particular pop group, etc.), that is incorporated in the
tangible commodity. For simplicity, we adopt a Cobb-Douglas speci…cation to nest T(:) and













As usual, the parameter ½ 2 (0;1)is related to the elasticity of substitution between di¤erent
varieties ¾ = 1=(1 ¡ ½) > 1: This coincides with the price elasticity of the demand for each
variety and therefore (inversely) measures the degree of market power of individual …rms. T(:)
is a function that matches the particular skill of the entrepreneur, s, and the state-of-the-art
technology, a, into the appreciated quality of the good. A product ”quality” thus depends
on two factors: the skill of the entrepreneur producing the good, s; and the existing stock of
technical knowledge a. This element re‡ects the cumulated stock of know-how in production
and in communication. A technological break-through enables …rms to improve their product
quality or to market their products more e¤ectively, raising consumers’ satisfaction. Here a
plays the role of a shift parameter. We assume that T(s;a) is a twice-di¤erentiable continuous
function satisfying some requirements: First, quality improves with technical progress, so that
Ta(s;a) > 0 for all s;a. Second, more talented entrepreneurs produce ”better” goods, so that
Ts(s;a)) > 0;for all s and a: Finally, we add structure to this function assuming that the
elasticity of T(:) with respect to s, #(s;a) ´ Ts(s;a)s=T(s;a), is monotonic in a. According
as #a(s;a) is equal to , higher or lower than zero, we say that technology is skill-neutral,
skill-complement or skill-substitute.
Notice that our production and consumption technologies capture two important asymme-
tries between the role of primary inputs and skills in production. First, while costs related to
primary inputs increase with output, the same expenditure for talent is required in serving a
large or a small market. Second, even if both factors are required for production of a ”stan-
dardized ” variety, X (i.e., a good of quality T(:) = 1), only workers’ (”entrepreneurial”) talent
8can add ”quality”, according to the technology T(s;a): These particular features of our model
– namely, non-convexities in production and consumers valuing the characteristics associated
with talented producers – give it its Rosen-type ‡avor.
3. Firms’ and households’ equilibrium
3.1. Demand, Exports and Imports
The results of our model depart in some aspects from the standard monopolistic competition
trade models (Helpman and Krugman (1986) [8]). Like the standard model, due to love for
variety, consumers will try to spread their purchases across all available goods, produced either
domestically or in the foreign country. However, not all …rms will …nd it convenient to supply
foreign consumers, because of the presence of …xed market access costs. In the standard model
all …rms sell abroad and their number is determined by the zero pro…t condition. Here, the
total number of …rms (entrepreneurs) is given, while the mass of exporting …rms is endogenously
determined.
We denote by an asterisk variables referring to the foreign country. Recall that, from the
assumption of symmetry, all …rms and workers abroad have access to the same technology as
domestic workers and …rms, de…ned by equation (2.1) and by the function T(s;a). Let N
and N¤ denote, respectively, the mass of distinct varieties of the consumption good produced
under free-trade at home and abroad. Now, let the subset Ne ´ fi 2 [Nm¤;N]; Nm¤ ¸ 0g
be associated with goods that are sold both at home and abroad (domestic exports, foreign
imports). By symmetry, the varieties Nm ´ fi 2 [N¤
m;N¤];N¤
m ¸ 0g denote home imports of
foreign goods.
In addition to the …xed market access costs ° (see (2.1)), there is another impediment to
trade, namely transport costs of the iceberg type. For one unit shipped abroad, 1¡¿ is lost in
transit, and only a fraction 0 < ¿ < 1 arrives to foreign consumers. Hence ¿ inversely measures
the extent of transport costs.
9Consider the home country. Household h maximizes utility (2.3) subject to the budget









where I is total domestic income

















Note from (3.1) that demand for variety i has unit elasticity with respect to quality and real
households’ income, and decreases with the relative price of good i with elasticity ¾. Demand
for imports, X¤










The lower the transport cost, the lower the relative import price of foreign varieties, the higher
imports. Moreover, as the domestic price index falls, real domestic income rises, so that
domestic demand for imports rises both for a substitution and for an income e¤ect.
We choose domestic raw inputs as a numeraire, so that v = 1: Given the perfect symmetry
of the model, it must also be v¤ = 1 at equilibrium.
Denote the …rm’s exports (foreign demand for its goods) by Xm¤: Depending on whether
…rm i is only selling on the domestic market or is also exporting, her pro…ts will di¤er:










Pro…t maximization leads to mark-up pricing. Since the elasticity of demand is the same for
each ”quality”, all …rms will set the same mark-up over marginal costs. Moreover, since all
…rms share the same technology, all varieties will sell for the same (”free-on-board”) price, in
both countries7
p(s(i);i) = p¤(s(i);i) =
¾
¾ ¡ 1
¯ ´ p for all i; s(i): (3.6)
As a result , the product quality will only show up in the quantities consumed by households,
who will buy more unit of better goods. Using this condition of symmetric pricing (3.6), the
domestic and foreign demand for home goods can be rewritten as follows:8
X(s;a;M) = p¡¾Y (M) T(s;a) (3.7)
Xm¤ (s;a;M¤) = p¡¾Y ¤(M¤)(T(s;a)¿¾¡1 (3.8)
where
Y (M) ´ I(M) P¾¡1; Y ¤(M¤) ´ I¤(M¤)P¤¾¡1 (3.9)
denote the domestic and foreign demands for a good of unitary price and ”standard” quality
(T(:) = 1). Because this variables enter multiplicatively in domestic and foreign sales, they can
be interpreted as a measure of the scale of a ”standard” …rm.
Two (endogenous) variables a¤ect the magnitude of Y : aggregate income, I; and the price
index, P. Given M, the distribution of skill earnings w(s) univocally determines aggregate
income I. Other things being equal, higher households’ income raises the demand for a …rm’s
product. Note also that the real income elasticity of demand is unity, while the relative price
elasticity is ¾ > 1. Therefore a higher P – a higher average price of competitors – raises the
demand for each individual producer.
7Consistently, we can omit henceforth the index i:







113.2. Income Distribution, Trade, and Technology
We now study the interaction between the distribution of wages and …rms’ choice to export.
Suppose that a …rm employing a type-s worker decides not to export. Free entry entails that
the earnings of the worker coincides with the …rm’s operating pro…ts. From (3.5) and (3.6) we
see that
wi(s;a;M) = (p ¡ ¯)X(s;a;M) = p1¡¾Y
T(s;a)
¾
´ wn(s;a;M); i = 2 Ne (3.10)
In the non-export sector, the earnings of a worker with skill s is positively related to the scale of
the domestic market, Y , and to the …rm’s market power, measured by the mark-up p¡¯ (which
is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand, ¾). Notice that the wage rate increases
linearly with quality, T(s;a). The elasticity of the wage with respect to the level of skill, s;
coincides with the elasticity of the quality index T; #(s;a) ´ Tss=T: Whenever the quality
of the product rises more than proportionately with the skill of the producer, #(s;a) > 1,
even small di¤erences in skills may result in a large earnings premia and in a skewed income
distribution, as in Rosen (1981)[15].
Assume now that a …rm employing a type-s worker decides to export. Recalling that an
exporting …rm must incur a …xed cost ° to access the foreign market, and imposing a = a¤;
and M = M¤; the wage of type-s worker is










¡ ° ´ we(s;a;M); i 2 Ne (3.11)
Comparing (3.10) and (3.11) we see that the wage premium increases even more with s if the
…rm is exporting, see …gure 1.
Insert …gure 1 here
The intuition is simple. Each additional unit of talent in exporting …rms allows for larger
sales in both home and foreign markets. This di¤erence in market size, Y ¤
Y ¿¾¡1; is translated
12in earnings di¤erentials. As in Rosen (1981), are the more talented that gain more from
market size.9 Note that the elasticity of the wage premium with respect to skills is larger in
the exporting sector, (we(s) + °)=we(s))#(s;a) > #(s;a); a feature which is consistent with
empirical evidence concerning the wage premium paid by exporting …rms (Bernard and Jensen
(1997)[1]).
>From (3.10) and (3.11) it is clear that, for given market size Y; trade integration due to
lower transport cost (higher ¿) or lower access cost °; boosts the earnings of workers employed
in the export sector, while leaving una¤ected wages in non-exporting …rms. Since, as we shall
see, the export sector employs workers of higher skills than the non-export sector, this tends
to raise income concentration.
It is now easy to see under what conditions a …rm employing a worker with skills s is willing
to venture on the export market. It will do so provided this raises its operating pro…ts, i.e.
we(s) ¸ wn(s): Since the access cost to foreign markets ° is independent of sales, while sales
increase with talent, only …rms employing su¢ciently skilled workers will sell on the foreign
















A ´ z; (3.13)
where Z(:;a) ´ T¡1(:;a):10
Consistently with the evidence previously discussed, …rms in the export sector tend to
employ workers with higher skill and, consequently, to pay them higher wages.
The ”degree of openness” of the economy is measured by the share of exporting …rms,
9”...no wonder that the best economists tend to be theorists and methodologists rather than narrow …eld
specialists, that the best artists sell their work in the great market of New York and Paris, not in Cincinnati,
..” Rosen (1981).
10Hence, Z1 = 1=Ts > 0; Za = ¡1=Ta < 0.
13R s
z Á(s)ds: This is endogenously determined. Openness rises (z falls) with the scale of the
foreign market, Y ¤, since this raises the skill premium and induces more entrepreneurs to
venture abroad. Holding constant Y ¤, technological change, as measured by changes in a,
reduces the cut-o¤ skill level z, because workers with lower skills start producing the threshold
quality (check from (3.13), recalling that Za = ¡1=Ta < 0:) Clearly, the model generates trade
provided
s < z ￿ s; (3.14)
a condition that we assume to be satis…ed in the following analysis.
Trade and technology shocks a¤ect openness z and market size Y ¤ simultaneously, so that
the implications for the wage distribution requires a joint solution for these variables.
4. Model Solution
Invoking symmetry , we can set Y = Y ¤; and z = z¤; and concentrate on the case of balanced
trade.11 Next we exploit the fact that each worker/…rm produces a single variety of the good.
The space of goods can consistently be mapped into that of skills, and the CES price index












Note that the price level P depends on openness, z: The price index falls whenever more …rms
decide to venture abroad (z falls). Due to ”love for variety”, a larger mass of varieties available
through imports raises indirect utility, thus reducing the true price index (which is dual to it).
In order to derive an expression for Y which only depends upon z, integrate across wages (3.10)
and (3.11) and substitute the resulting expressions into aggregate income (3.2). This yields
11By symmetry, N = N
¤; Nm¤ = N
¤



























s T(s;a)Á(s)ds + ¿¾¡1 R s
z T(s;a)Á(s)ds
i (4.3)
The numerator of expression (4.3) represents the total income of primary inputs employed in
manufacturing, M; net of the income earned in export services. Clearly, the more resources are
used up in market-access services, the lower the amount of resources that are left for production,
and the lower the market size facing a standard …rm, Y . The denominator is inversely related
to the price index. Since elasticity of demand to the …rm relative price exceeds unity (see
(3.1)), the substitution e¤ect prevails on the income e¤ect. Hence when the general price index
rises (the denominator falls), the individual producer becomes more competitive and her sales
rise. It is immediate to check that this expression depends positively on z, Yz > 0. Two e¤ects
at work in the same direction. First, when the number of exporting …rm falls (z rises), less
resources are used for market access, so that the mass of production factors employable in
production increases, together with …rms’ scale. Second, as imports fall, the CES price index
rises (see (4.1)), and this makes domestic …rms more competitive.
Equations (3.13) and (4.3) jointly determine the size of the export sector, z and the size of
a standard …rm in the domestic market, Y . The equilibrium can be represented on a simple
diagram. Figure 3 depicts equation (4.3), the Y Y curve, and equation (3.13), the ZZ curve,
in the (z;Y ) space.12
Insert Figure 2 here
The properties of the two curves imply that there exists an unique equilibrium, represented
12Note that since we consider an equilibrium with trade, s < z ￿ s must hold. Consistently, the range of












15by the intersection of the two loci. This diagram will help the analysis of next sections, where
we perform comparative statics on the system.
5. Trade Integration
Our aim is in this section is to assess the implications of trade integration on the wage distri-
bution. From our diagram and from (3.13) we see that a reduction in transport costs (a rise
in ¿) shifts the ZZ curve down to the left (see …gure 3). As transport costs fall, the price
set abroad by domestic …rms is reduced, foreign demand increases, and the mass of exporters
rises (z falls). From (4.3) we see that the Y Y locus shifts up to the left. Lower transport costs
increase competition from abroad, thus reducing demand for each …rm, at given z. In the new
equilibrium, Y unambiguously falls. Even if total sales are boosted by increased exports, each
…rm operates on a smaller scale. The degree of openness is subject to two con‡icting forces.
One the one hand, lower transport costs boost the demand for exports through a direct price
e¤ect. This raises the mass of …rms willing to export (see (3.13)), and z falls. On the other
hand, lower transport costs have a negative e¤ect on foreign demand through a scale e¤ect (Y ¤
falls), and this reduces the mass of export-oriented …rms (z rises). It can be shown (see the
Appendix) that the price e¤ect always dominates, so that the economy becomes more open
when transport costs falls, dz=d¿ < 0, con…rming partial equilibrium intuitions.
Insert …gure 3 here
>From this result we can derive the e¤ects on the distribution of wages. Equation (3.10)
shows that skill premia in the non-exporting sector, wn(s), must fall proportionately to the
contraction the …rm’s scale, Y: Conversely, from (3.11) we see that wages in the export sector,
we(s) may either fall, because market scale Y shrinks, or rise, because lower transport costs
entail larger sales abroad.13 Clearly, even if wages fall in the exporting sector, prevailing the
…rst direct e¤ect, they will fall by less than they do in the non export sector. More precisely,
13This second e¤ect dominates provided demand is su¢ciently elastic (¾ high).
16taken any one worker in the non export sector, indexed by skill s0 ¸ z and any one in the
export sector, s00 < z, it is possible to show that their relative wage di¤erential , we(s0)=wn(s00),
widens with trade integration (see the Appendix). Given that lower transport costs tend to
raise the share of the export sector (dz=d¿ < 0); a reduction in transport costs unambiguously
implies a redistribution of income from the non-export to the export sector of the economy.
It is easy to work out the distributional e¤ects between skilled workers, S on one hand,
























since dz=d¿ < 0. A reduction in transport costs tilts the income distribution in favor of primary
inputs. This result follows immediately by recalling that exporting requires a …xed access cost in
term of these inputs. As more …rms venture abroad, more primary commodities are demanded
for export services. Hence the share of wage rents must fall.
Finally, the e¤ect of trade integration on total welfare can be assessed by looking at changes
in the utilitarian indicator W ´ I=P = ¢=P +M=P . First notice that a fall in transport costs
reduces the price level. From (4.1), we see that this is due to two reasons. First, a direct positive
e¤ect via lower price of imported good. Second, an indirect e¤ect through the reduction of the
threshold z, which raises average quality. As a consequence, the ”real” earnings of primary
inputs, M=P; unambiguously rises. As for aggregate real skill earnings, ¢=P, the e¤ects are
ambiguous, since ¢ is reduced by higher ¿. In the Appendix we show that the overall e¤ect of
lower transport is to increase total welfare, as measured by I=P.
In summary:
Proposition 1. trade integration via lower transport (higher ¿) has the following e¤ects: i)
17openness rises (z falls) and the scale of the standard …rm on the domestic market Y shrinks;
ii) wages in non-exporting …rms are reduced, wages in exporting …rms may rise or fall, and
their ratio, we(s0)=wn(s00), rises iii) there is a redistribution from skill to raw inputs: ¢ falls;
iv) total welfare W rises.
Two remarks are in order. First, whether trade integration occurs as a result of lower
transport cost or because of a reduction in the …xed cost of exporting, °; does somewhat
a¤ects the results. Again, it can be shown that trade integration via lower market access
cost redistributes income towards the exporting sector, raises the share of traded goods in the
economy, and is welfare improving. However the e¤ects on aggregate skill rents and upon the
…rms’ scale become ambiguous.14 Second, the fact that aggregate welfare rises as transport
costs fall, does not imply that lower trade barriers lead to a Pareto improvement. In other
words, some agents may end up worse o¤ when transport costs fall. The distribution of the
gains and looses clearly depends on the skill distribution and on the initial distribution of raw
inputs Mh: If a worker is employed in the non-export sector (has low skill) and has also a
small endowment of raw inputs, it is likely to be hurt by trade integration. To see this more
formally, consider a worker employed in the non-exporting sector, who has zero endowment of


















Since @P=@¿ < 0 and @I=@¿ = @¢=@¿ < 0; ¾ ¸ 2 is su¢cient to imply @!n(s)=@¿ < 0.
14These results can be obtained from the authors upon request.
186. Technological Progress
Now consider what happens when, as a result of a rise in technical knowledge, a;the quality
of all products improves. Clearly, this means that a lower skill endowment is now required
for achieving any given quality standard. Thus, from (3.13) the ZZ curve shifts down to the
left in Figure 1 (recall that Za = ¡1=Ta < 0:) A higher fraction of …rms can bene…t from
exporting, at given scale Y . In turn, from (4.3), the Y Y curve shifts up to the left, since the
price index falls when average quality improves. Hence, each …rm’s output becomes relatively
more expensive compared with that of competitors, and demand falls. In the new equilibrium,
a technology shock reduces the …rm’s size, Y , but, di¤erently from trade integration, has an
ambiguous e¤ect on openness, z:
The implications for wages can be assessed as follows. Denote the elasticity of product
quality and of …rm scale with respect to a;respectively, by ´(s;a) = Ta(s;a)a=T(s;a); and









[´(s;a) ¡ »(a)] ¸ 0 (6.1)
in both the export and non export sector.
A technology shock exerts two contrasting forces on wages: a positive, …rm-speci…c e¤ect,
´; and a common negative e¤ect, ». The …rst one re‡ects the fact that better quality directly
raises …rms’ demand, thus boosting operating pro…ts. The second e¤ect works through rivals’
competition. As the general price level falls due to better average quality, each …rm’s product
become relatively more expensive, and this lowers …rms’ size Y: As a consequence, the e¤ects
on skill earnings and income distribution are in general ambiguous.
A useful benchmark is the case of a linear technology T(s;a) = as: It is easy to show
that in this case ´(s;a) = »(a) = 1; (see Appendix). The …rm-speci…c e¤ect is completely
o¤set by the common e¤ect, so that nominal wages are una¤ected by the shock. In this linear
example, aggregate skill earnings ¢ are not a¤ected by technology shocks (see from (5.1)).
Nor is the income distribution between entrepreneurs and primary inputs. In summary, when
19technological improvements are skill-neutral, they simply result into a lower price index, thus
raising welfare, W.
In order to generalize the analysis, remember that all …rms experience lower sales via the
common competition e¤ect, »(a); while the positive ”quality” e¤ect, ´(s;a); varies across …rms.
For some s; the square bracket in (6.1) may be positive: these …rms will bene…t from technical
progress. For some other, the opposite may hold, ´(s;a) < »(a); implying a loss. Of course,
results crucially depend on how ´(s;a) changes with s. Suppose, for instance, that technology
is skill-complement, that is Tas(s;a) is ”su¢ciently” large, so that entrepreneurs with high
skill can exploit the technical innovation better than less talented entrepreneurs.15 Then the
”quality” e¤ect will tend to dominate for more skilled workers, who will bene…t from the
innovation, while the ”competition” e¤ect may dominate for the less skilled, who will lose. In
the Appendix we show that there always exists a skill level e s 2 [s;s] such that the two e¤ect
cancel out: ´(e s;a) = »(a): Provided technology and skill are complements, a technological
shock boosts the earnings a workers with skill s > e s and reduces those of workers of type s < e s.
Also, for reason discussed in the Appendix, the e¤ect on z has ambiguous sign.
Finally, skill-biased technology shocks also have ambiguous implications on the aggregate
income distribution between raw inputs and skilled workers. This can be understood by di¤er-










and recalling that z may either fall or rise.
Similarly to trade shocks, technical progress can be show to raise welfare W (see the Ap-
pendix).
Summarizing,
15A simple example of skill-complement technology is T(s;a) = as + c;c > 0: The product’s quality depends
on a common ”state of the art” component, c; and on an idiosyncratic one, proportional to the level of skills.
20Proposition 2. technological progress (an increase in a) has the following e¤ects i) open-
ness (z) may rise or fall, while …rms’ scale Y falls; ii) if technology is skill-complement (skill-
substitute), workers endowed with talent s < e s experience a fall (rise) in their wage rate; iii)
the aggregate skill premium, ¢, may rise or fall; iv) total welfare, W, rises.
Two are the main di¤erences with respect to trade integration. First, skill-biased technology
shocks may redistribute earnings among …rms belonging to the same sector, while trade shocks
unambiguously redistributes income from the non-export to the export sector. Second, while
reduced trade barriers increase the extent of trade integration, technological shocks have an
ambiguous e¤ect on the share of exporting …rms.
7. Conclusions
We have studied the e¤ects ”globalization” on wage inequality. Many di¤erent things are often
meant by ”global economy”. In the spirit of the ”Economics of Superstar”, we have discussed
two: trade integration in the form of lower transport cost, and technology innovations that
enable suppliers to improve the (perceived) quality of their products and raise consumers’
satisfaction.
If globalization takes place in terms of reduced trade barriers, then we …nd that income is
redistributed from non-exporting to exporting …rms (and that more …rms choose to export).
Since the former generally employ workers of lower skill and pay, the e¤ect is to raise the
extent of wage inequality, although welfare, as measured by real GDP, rises. This result di¤ers
from the conclusions of much of the existing trade theory. Income redistribution in favor of
the export sector is a well-known feature of “…xed-factor” models (Jones (1971)[10]). In our
model, however, trade is intra-industry, and wage di¤erentials widen even among exporting
…rms. Conversely, the new trade theories typically imply that (intra-industry) trade does not
produce victims. In our setting, trade (and technology) shocks have di¤erent e¤ects upon
workers with di¤erent abilities. Real gains to a seller are guaranteed only if she does better
than the average competitor.
21If globalization takes place in terms of improved production or communication technologies,
then we …nd more ambiguous e¤ects: the less skilled may either lose or gain, depending on
whether technology is skill-complement or substitute, and the share of exporting …rms may
either rise or fall.
Clearly, our results derive from an extreme view of the labor market, where wage earnings
are associated with skill-speci…c rents. However, these …ndings provide a criterion for disen-
tangling empirically the distributive impact of trade and technology. Rising wage inequality
across plants or …rms should be systematically associated with the export status of …rms (as
found in Bernard and Jensen (1997)[1]) only in the case of trade shocks.16
The main policy implication of the analysis is that globalization, although welfare improv-
ing, is likely to raise inequality, and to foster demand for protection, in particular by the non
traded sector. Redistribution, rather than protection, should be the answer. The implications
for redistribution, however, may be more complex than the traditional skilled/unskilled dis-
tinction would suggest. Globalization entails income transfers even among those workers that
appear to be skilled. The export status of …rms and plants may guide policy action to target
the sectors who stand to loose more.
8. Appendix
8.1. Lower transport costs
8.1.1. E¤ects on openness (z) and …rm size (Y )
We show that @z=@¿ < 0;@Y=@¿ < 0
Proof. Total di¤erentiation of the system formed by (3.13) and (4.3) yields
16Bernard and Jensen (1997)[1] are cautious in attributing wage inequality changes to export demand alone, in
that export status and technology status appear to be strongly correlated. It is to note that, in our framework,











1 ¡ zY Yz
; (8.2)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Recall that zY < 0 and Yz > 0; so that the
denominator of (8.1) and (8.2) is positive. In the second expression Y¿ < 0 and z¿ < 0 , so
that @Y
@¿ < 0:
As for z, the two terms in the numerator have con‡icting sign, z¿ < 0 and zY Y¿ > 0.
Therefore @z











(1 ¡ ¾)¿¡¾ = ¡(¾ ¡ 1)T(z;a)=Ts(z;a) Y ¿: (8.4)
>From (4.3) we derive







where - > 0 and ¤ > 0 represent, respectively, the numerator and denominator of (4.3).









It appears that the condition zY Y¿ > ¡z¿ which is necessary and su¢cient for @z
@¿ > 0can be
satis…ed if and only if
p1¡¾ (¾ ¡ 1)¤¡1
Z s
z
T(s;a)Á(s)ds > ¾¿1¡¾: (8.6)












s T(s;a)Á(s)ds + ¿¾¡1 R s
z T(s;a)Á(s)ds
> 1: (8.8)
This inequality is never satis…ed. So we …nd that @z
@¿ < 0:
8.1.2. E¤ects on relative wages,
We show that @(we(s0)=wn(s00)=@¿ > 0 for s0 > z, s00 ￿ z:




Following a reduction in trade barriers, relative wages computed at the threshold value z must
rise. Take any relative wage rate in the non-export sector wn(s0)=wn(s00), s0 ¸ z, s00 ¸ z. These
are not a¤ected by transport costs (check (3.10)). Note also that, given any pair of wages for
















= 0, s < z:
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, s ¸ z:













248.1.3. E¤ects on welfare
We show that @W
@¿ > 0:
Proof. Our utilitarian welfare indicator, W = I































@¿ and simplifying, we note that @W










































T(s;a)Á(s)ds > 0; (8.15)
an inequality which is always satis…ed.
8.2. Technological progress
8.2.1. Linear Technology
We show that when T(s;a) = as, then
dw(s)
da = 0 for all s, a:
Note …rst that when T(s;a) = as, trivially ´(s;a) = 1 for all s, a: >From equations (4.3)













25When T(s;a) = as, z is una¤ected by technology shocks (the term a at the denominator of z
cancels out with the term a appearing at the denominator of Y ). As a result, ´(s;a) = »(a) = 1,
and, by (??),
dw(s)
da = 0 for all s, a
8.2.2. E¤ects on wages
We prove that there always exists one and only one value e s; e s 2 [s;s] such that ´(s;a) = »(a):
Proof. We …rst claim the following results.
Result 1. The term ´(s;a) is monotonically increasing (respectively., decreasing) in s
whenever technology is skill-complement (respectively., skill substitute).
Proof. Consider the case of skill-complement technology, so that the elasticity #(s;a) ´
Ts(s;a)s=T(s;a);is increasing in a; #a(s;a) > 0 for all s;a. Note that #a(s;a) > 0 if and only
if Tas(s;a) >
Ta(s;a)Ts(s;a)
T(s;a) : From the de…nition of ´(s;a), ´(s;a) = Ta(s;a)a=T(s;a), it emerges
that this condition is also necessary and su¢cient for ´s(s;a) > 0. Symmetrically, in the case
of skill-substitute technology, #a(s;a) < 0 implies ´s(s;a) < 0.
Result 2. ´(z;a) ¡ »(a) ¸ 0 is a necessary and su¢cient condition for @z=@a ￿ 0







Using (3.11), (3.10), and (6.1), the above condition amounts to
[´(z;a) ¡ »(a)]¿¾¡1 ¸ 0: (8.18)
26Consider the case of skill-complement technology. Assume that a value for s satisfying
´(s;a) = »(a) does not exist. Then, by Result 1, either
i) ´(s;a) > »(a); (8.19)
or
ii) ´(s;a) < »(a): (8.20)
Assume that i) holds. Then, by Result 1 and (6.1), following a rise in the stock of knowledge
a; all wages must rise. Moreover, by Result 2, it must be @z=@a < 0. From (6.2), @z=@a < 0
implies @¢=@a < 0. But this contradicts Result 1, according to which @¢=@a > 0; because
all wages must rise after the shock. Assume, conversely, that ii) holds. Then, by Result 1
and (6.1), a rise in the stock of knowledge a; must reduce all wages. Furthermore, by Result
2, it must be @z=@a > 0. Again, @z=@a > 0 is in contradiction with Result 1, according to
which @¢=@a < 0 because all wages must fall: A symmetric argument applies to the case of
skill-substitute technology.
So, Result 1, Result 2, and (6.1) imply that a value e s; e s 2 [s;s] such that ´(s;a) = »(a)
must exist. Uniqueness is insured by the fact that ´(s;a) is monotonic in s:
8.2.3. E¤ects on welfare
We show that @W=@a > 0
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Using the de…nition of T(z;a) from (3.13) it is straightforward that the left hand side of
(8.22) is identically equal to zero, so that the inequality holds.
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